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Confirmation and falsification are different
strategies for testing theories and character-
izing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly
speaking, confirmation is the act of using
evidence or reason to verify or certify that a
statement is true, definite, or approximately
true, whereas falsification is the act of clas-
sifying a statement as false in the light of
observation reports.
In clinical practice, the issue of confirmation
versus falsification was highlighted by Karl
Popper (1902–94), in his critique of Freud’s
and Adler’s depth psychologies. Wishing to
demarcate science from nonscientific pursuits,
Popper contrasted Einstein’s falsifiable theory
with the “confirmable” but unfalsifiable the-
ories of Freud and Adler. On the one hand,
almost any behavior could be interpreted as
“confirming” Freud’s or Adler’s theory, because
the behavioral evidence is itself interpreted in
the light of the theories. This makes confir-
mations worthless. Moreover, Freud failed to
stipulate conditions under which the theory
would be falsified. For example, what obser-
vation would show that the id does not exist?
In contrast, Einstein boldly stipulated decisive
experimental observations that, if satisfied,
would refute his theory. For example, if the
path of light from a distant star had not been
observed (by Eddington in 1919) to bend by a
certain degree when passing close to the sun,
Einstein would have abandoned his theory.
Popper’s proposed method is falsification-
ism. Instead of proposing hypotheses and then
seeing if they can be confirmed by evidence,
Popper said that science ought to involve mak-
ing conjectures that can potentially be refuted.
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Stimulated by a problem, the scientist advances
unfounded theories, which are then subjected
to relentless attempts to falsify them by obser-
vation; confirmation is seen as infeasible and
pointless, irrelevant. This barrage of criticism
then leads to further, deeper problems, which
in turn stimulate further theories, potentially
nearer to the truth. Because conjectures are
freely made and retained until falsified, no
justifications or inductive confirmation rules
are needed. This is not a description of science,
but a proposal about what scientists ought to
do to advance science.
The problem of confirmation versus falsi-
fication is an intense focus of debate within
a wider context of fundamentally competing
epistemologies: justificationism and critical
rationalism. Justificationism is the idea that
one should accept all and only those positions
that one can justify by logic or experience.
The heyday of justificationism was the Vienna
Circle of the 1920s and 1930s, when its mem-
bers, such as Rudolph Carnap, Otto Neurath,
Moritz Schlick, and Friedrich Waismann, held
that there are only two types of knowledge:
analytic knowledge, which is justified by for-
mal proof, and scientific knowledge, which is
justified by empirical verification. Only those
statements that are in principle justifiable by
one or other of these methods are, they main-
tained, amenable to rational discussion. Most
contemporary philosophers, though spurning
the Vienna Circle’s views on verification, are
still justificationists as they hold on to the
traditional conception of knowledge as justi-
fied true belief. However, under the impact of
skepticism, many have jettisoned the pursuit
of truth as unattainable, settling for simply
justified positions.
Popper’s answer to justificationism is crit-
ical rationalism. Critical rationalism shuns
justification as both impossible and unneces-
sary, substituting the pursuit of truth as the
fallible but sometimes attainable aim. Critical
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rationalism regards knowledge, at least scien-
tific knowledge, as unjustified, largely untrue,
unbelief. Untrue because merely close to the
truth; unbelief because it is largely embodied
not in belief but in books and computers.
The scientific method of falsificationism is
the father of critical rationalism. It is the gen-
eralization to all knowledge, whether empirical
or not, of falsificationism, the empirical sci-
entific method. Unlike the Vienna Circle,
for example, critical rationalism regards all
positions as amenable to rational discussion.
Critical rationalism flows from a fallibilist
but optimistic attitude. Each of us is infinitely
ignorant, we are always prone to error, and we
only know little bits of knowledge. I may be
wrong and you may be right, and through the
cooperative competition of debate, we may get
nearer to the truth.Wemay attain the truth, but
not “know” it in the traditional sense, just as
one may reach the summit of a mountain (the
goal of one’s journey) but not know it because
one is in fog. For the critical rationalist, getting
to the summit is still worth the effort, even
with uncertainty.
The issue of confirmation in science goes
back to Aristotle, one of the earliest justifica-
tionists. Aristotle wished to provide a method
for establishing knowledge of nature, demon-
strable knowledge, episteme, as distinguished
from mere opinion, doxa. In this Aristotle
broke from a long line of philosophers (the
pre-Socratics and even Socrates himself) who
thought that knowledge was something only
the gods could possess.
The method was induction, by which Aristo-
tle meant a way of getting to an outlook from
which one could see or “intuit” the essence
of the thing in question. This essence would
then be embodied in a definition that could be
used as a premise in arguments purportedly
demonstrating a conclusion about some mat-
ter. Aristotle was driven to this route because
he was aware that his syllogisms, although
valid, did not establish or prove the truth
of their conclusion, but only asserted that if
the premises were true then the conclusion
would also be true. For example, all ravens
are black; Edgar is a raven; therefore, Edgar
is black. However, if the truth of the premises
is not demonstrated, then we require another
argument to demonstrate those, and this argu-
ment in turn would require its premises to be
established, and so on ad infinitum. Aristotle’s
essential definitions were supposed to provide
proven starting points that would avoid such a
vicious infinite regress. In this case, if one takes
being black as part of the essential definition
of a raven, then one may stop at that premises
and avoid the infinite regress. Aristotle’s view
held sway for 2000 years.
Francis Bacon rejected Aristotle’s approach
to proof. In contrast, In his Novum Organum
Bacon (1620) argued that one must start, not
from intuition, but from observation to dis-
cover the laws of hidden forms and natures
of matter that explain phenomena. Bacon
also called his method “induction.” On the
standard account, Bacon said that provided
we are careful to divest the mind of “idols”
or prejudices, a proposed law of nature could
be confirmed by the collection of many and
varied observations. For example, observing
many black ravens and only black ravens leads
to the inference that all ravens are black. Every
new black raven is then said to confirm the
general statement. One could then infer from
this observational starting point laws of higher
and higher generality and depth, ultimately
revealing the hidden nature of things.
Bacon argued that confirming instances and
falsifying instances were both feasible and
important, but emphasized falsifying instances
to safeguard against premature generalizations.
Regularities per se may be misleading. We may
put this clearer than Bacon did. For example, it
is possible that every time you observe a clock,
the pendulum is on the right side. The infer-
ence that the pendulum is always on the right
side would be incorrect. The example may be
extended infinitely with the same result. That
is, even if you start with an infinite number of
correct statements of the pendulum being on
the right side, it still does not license the infer-
ence that the pendulum is always on the right.
This point of logic is independent of whether
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the pendulum is being observed or not. The
regularities of nature may also be misleading,
but not in so obvious a way. One can also see in
this example why confirming instances may be
less valuable than onemight at first grant.There
is some dispute (see Urbach, 1987) whether
it was Bacon who promulgated the induction
by numerous, varied observations, but it is
nevertheless an important early rudimentary
development of the theory of confirmation that
deserves comment.
David Hume (1711–76) (1976/1739, book 1,
part 3, section 6) raised the problem of induc-
tion. He raised a fundamental problem for the
inductive confirmation of universal theories of
science and the prediction of new phenomena
from earlier phenomena. Hume does not keep
these two aspects sufficiently apart, but they
both make it difficult to uphold induction.
Hume starts with a puzzle. There is only
one source of new knowledge: experience.
However, our claims to knowledge seem to go
far beyond what we can infer from experience.
Hume does not use the word “induction,”
but discusses what has become known as the
principle of induction: “that instances of which
we have had no experience must resemble
those of which we have had experience, and
that the course of nature continues always
uniformly the same.” Hume argued that this
goes far beyond our experience. For example,
all ravens of which we have had experience
have been black. We therefore expect the next
one also to be black. However, Hume insists,
this is deductively invalid.
Hume pointed out that laws of nature are
universal. They speak about the whole of space
and time. Thus the statement “All ravens are
black” covers everything in the universe that
is an raven, all past, present and future ravens,
and all non-ravens too if it is understood as
the universal conditional: for anything y, if y
is a raven, then y is black. A deductively valid
argument is one in which if the premises were
true then the conclusion must be true. For
example, all owls are nocturnal; this bird in
my garden is an owl; therefore, this bird in my
garden is nocturnal. If we accept the truth of
the premises, we are committed, on pain of
contradiction, to the truth of the conclusion.
However, in the case of an induction, this is not
correct, since no matter how many nocturnal
owls one has observed, the very next one could
be mostly active during the day and sleep at
night.
Hume’s devastating attack on induction did
not stop there. A champion of induction might
retreat to the claim that at least an inductive
argument makes the conclusion probably true,
and that the more positive observations we
collect, the more probable our result. However,
Hume pointed out that this would only delay
the impact of his point, since how are we
supposed to confirm this rule of induction?
If we say that it is confirmed by its having
worked in the past, then we cannot do this
without falling into circular reasoning. To rely
on induction to justify induction is to argue in
a vicious circle. Further, simply postulating a
general principle of the uniformity of nature
to somehow endorse particular inductions is
to abandon the empirical point of view that
it is experience alone that ought to be the
judge of our theories. However, it is unclear
how such a vague postulate can add anything
specific to our choice between particular causal
hypotheses. Some thinkers have suggested that
there is such a principle, but it remains an
unanswered question how we are to falsify (or
confirm) these principles themselves. For if we
do not have any such potential falsifications (or
confirmations) how are we to choose between
alternative candidates for the job?
Hume’s argument is reinforced by the
observation that there have been many reg-
ularities we have observed without exception
for hundreds or even thousands of years that
have been rudely interrupted by an eventual
exception. Consider the following examples.
Newton’s theory held its position with many
confirmations for about 250 years. How-
ever, Einstein’s new theory refuted it. For
thousands of years it was thought that all
life needs light to survive. However, in the
last couple of decades we have discovered
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bacteria—so-called extremophiles—living far
below the earth’s surface, which live on purely
chemical energy.
Bertrand Russell (1985/1918, p. 101) rein-
forced Hume’s argument by pointing out that
induction cannot even work in a finite uni-
verse. Because even if one had, by hypothesis,
observed every relevant particular case in a
universe, it is not only an extra step to say
that there are no more cases, it is to assert a
universal statement, again going beyond all
possible finite collections of facts.
Contemporary conceptions of laws of nature
make Hume’s argument even stronger. Hume
conceived of laws of nature as simply unbroken
series of contiguous conjunctions of phenom-
ena. For example, consider, under suitable
conditions, the scratching of a dry match is
always conjoined with the succeeding event of
flames. However, recent philosophical concep-
tions of laws sees them as implying subjunctive
conditionals, expressed in the form: if p were to
happen, then q would happen. In this case, one
such subjunctive conditional would be: “if any
dry match were scratched, then there would
be a flame.” It is clear that this goes beyond all
possible observation, because it covers all the
actual and possible matches that could have
been scratched in the past, but were not, and
all possible and actual matches that could, but
will not, be scratched now or in the future.
The attraction of Bacon’s induction was that
it held out the possibility that provided one had
divested the mind of what Bacon called “idols”
(prejudices, preconceptions, hypotheses) one
could see the manifest regularities of natural
phenomena. However, the nineteenth-century
polymath William Whewell (1794–1866)
pointed out that nature does not come ready
labeled. We have to classify in advance the
types of events or aspects that are relevant to
our investigation. Without any such prior con-
ceptual division of the world, we are without a
properly defined aim. It would be like telling
someone to observe without also telling what
to observe and with what aim. For example,
if we are trying to understand how planetary
objects behave under the influence of gravity,
do we observe their shape, mass, density, bulk,
or weight? It is clear that even these conceptual
classifications are highly theoretical.
In contrast to justificationism, falsification-
ism escapes Hume’s problem of induction.
Because conjectures are freely made and then
retained until falsified, no induction-like
rules are needed. In addition, falsification-
ism escapes Whewell’s strictures because it
fully accepts that we start with theories, not
with data.
The Paradoxes of Confirmation
and Falsification
In comparing confirmation and falsification-
ism it is helpful to see how each strategy copes
with some paradoxes.
The Raven Paradox
Carl Hempel first reminded us of Nicod’s
seemingly harmless principle of confirmation
that the universal (x)(Ax→Cx) is confirmed
by objects that are A and C. “(x)(Ax→Cx)”
means: for any object x, if it is A, then it is C.
Second, Hempel pointed out that the universal
theory “All ravens are black” is logically equiv-
alent to “All non-black things are non-ravens.”
When one is true, the other is true; when one
is false the other is false. Hempel then invoked
what to the inductivist is the plausible prin-
ciple that whatever confirms a statement also
confirms any logically equivalent statement.
However, that would mean that observing a
white shoe (a non-black non-raven) would
confirm the theory that all ravens are black.
This upsets the confirmationist’s intuition.
Hempel argued that we rule out such para-
doxes by invoking our background knowledge,
which has already ruled out shoes as a relevant
thing to observe. However, this maneuver only
shifts the problem of inductive confirmation
back to these background conjectures because
it leaves unanswered the question how we are
supposed to confirm that background knowl-
edge without falling into a vicious regress? In
contrast, as Popper (1977/1934) pointed out,
falsification does not have a similar vicious
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regress. Even a falsifying statement may be
tested in its turn. But whereas falsificationism
requires that all scientific statements have to be
testable, that does not require that they are all
tested. One can and has to stop somewhere.
There is no initial paradox afflicting falsifi-
cationism because there is nothing odd about
saying that when one refutes the theory “All
ravens are black” one is also refuting the state-
ment “All non-black things are non-ravens.”
More importantly, there is no falsification-
ist counterpart to Nicod’s principle. When
one refutes a theory, there is no requirement
that one also refute every single one of its
implications.
The Grue Paradox
Goodman (1955/1979) raised an interesting
paradox concerning confirmation with the
concept of grue. Grue means “is first examined
before 2020 and is green or is examined after
2020 and is blue.” Given that definition, it
becomes a puzzle why we are prepared to
countenance the inference from the fact that
all observed emeralds have been green to “All
emeralds are green” but not to “All emeralds are
grue,” since every observed green emerald up
to 2020 confirms both universal gem theories.
What vexes inductive philosophers is that
inferences about grue seem just as valid as
inferences about green by a supposed induc-
tive logic. Goodman argued that the reason
we choose green over grue is that the former
concept is more projectible, meaning that it is
more entrenched in our linguistic habits.
One falsificationist answer to this conun-
drum is to say that scientific method requires
the comparison of different hypotheses that we
can subject to a decisive experiment. Grue-like
hypotheses do not have this characteristic and
so should not be admitted to the body of scien-
tific theories under test. Some inductivists (e.g.
Worrall, 1989) say that this approach makes
the choice of green over grue “arbitrary,” even
an “historical accident.” However, as Quine
(1977) explains, the evolution of our conjec-
tures about gems, minerals, and chemistry
over thousands of years is far from arbitrary.
Another falsificationist response is to say that
the grue hypothesis does not solve any problem
that our familiar green emerald theory cannot
solve just as well (see Bartley, 1968).
TheAsymmetry of Falsification
and Confirmation
Popper (1977/1934, section 6, 1983, section
22) argued that there is a fundamental logical
asymmetry between falsification and verifica-
tion which follows from the logical form of
scientific theories, which are universal state-
ments. The statement “The raven in my room
now is white” is fully decidable in principle
because we can either verify it or falsify it.
This is typical of our test statements. But our
theories are only partially decidable, because
even though we can falsify them, we cannot
verify them.
Given a universal statement and initial con-
ditions, predicted specific observations can
be validly inferred. If these observations fail
to occur, it follows that the theory is false.
This valid inference is called modus tollens.
An example of the valid modus tollens is: If
someone has a cold, then they’ll sneeze; John
is not sneezing; therefore, John does not have a
cold. However, if the predicted observations do
occur, inferring that the theory must therefore
be true would involve the fallacy of affirming
the consequent, but that is what confirmation
seems to require. An example of the invalid
affirming the consequent is: If someone has
a cold, then they’ll sneeze; John is sneezing;
therefore, John has a cold. (People sneeze for
other reasons too.) The asymmetry is that
falsifying observations allow us to draw valid
conclusions about the theory under test, but
the confirming observations do not.
One objection to this holds that the asym-
metry is an illusion, because whenever we
refute a universal statement we thereby verify
its negation. A universal statement “All x are y”
is equivalent to “There is no non-y x.” There-
fore, when we refute “All apples are green”
we automatically verify “There is a non-green
apple.” We can, therefore, equally speak about
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verification instead of falsification and so
the two are perfectly symmetrical. Popper
(1977/1934) had already covered the logical
equivalence of nonexistence statements and
universal laws, and replied that this misses the
point, rather as if someone had said because
positive and negative numbers have many
symmetrical properties, therefore they are
perfectly symmetrical.
Duhem/Quine Problem
Duhem (1991/1914) and Quine (1961/1951)
each raised a problem with how one assigns
the fault of a falsification. They argued that in
a scientific test of a theory, one must first work
out a testable implication of this theory, an
observable event that ought to present itself if
the theory is true. One uses a valid argument to
tease out the expected observation statement
from the theory. However, to work this impli-
cation out one typically needs a host of other
auxiliary assumptions regarding equipment,
initial conditions, and background theories. So
the question is, when the expected event fails
to appear, which of the premises is at fault—the
main theory by itself, and/or one (or more) of
the other assumptions used in the deduction?
The fact that our argument is valid only tells us
that at least one of the premises is at fault. For
example, if an electric door opener is installed,
when you walk up to the door it will open.
If the door does not open, that may mean
that a door opener is not installed. But we are
assuming that the power is on, that the door
opener is hooked up properly, that the door
is not locked, that we are not dreaming, etc.
Duhem and Quine said that, without appeal
to other principles such as simplicity, this is
undecidable.
Duhem and Quine’s positions are different in
some respects. Whereas Duhem confines the
group of problematic auxiliary assumptions to
physics, Quine extends the group to the whole
of human knowledge and also sees it as apply-
ing to both verification and falsification. For
Quine, in the face of recalcitrant observations,
one may even consider abandoning logical or
mathematical assumptions such as the law of
the excluded middle (that a statement is either
true or false, with no third option). Some
interpreters of quantum theory suggest that
this law does not apply at the quantum level.
The falsificationist’s answer is that fallibil-
ity prevails even in the interpretation of test
results. We may be wrong in assigning the fault
of a refutation. However, this does not mean
that we cannot successfully classify statements
as true, as opposed to certifying them. One
ought to choose auxiliary assumptions that
are unproblematic, and it is only a rampant
undiscriminating skepticism that could rank
everything as problematic. Falsificationists
assume that scientists—though fallible—can
at least sometimes classify trivial observation
reports as true, for example, correctly reading
an on/off light. If someone conjectures that
some subset of the auxiliary assumptions is
problematic, then they are free to set up an
experiment to test that set using what they
regard as unproblematic assumptions.
Probability and Inductive
Confirmation
Having surrendered to Hume’s attack, most
justificationists have sought solace in the hope
that induction might at least provide some
theories that are more probable and reliable
than others. The most popular contenders
for some time for the title of probabilistic
induction are the Bayesian interpretations of
probability. To evaluate the probability of a
hypothesis, the Bayesian specifies some prior
probability for a given hypothesis, which is
then updated by new information. These are
subjective degrees of probability ranging from
0 (no belief) to 1 (certainty). The Bayesian
interpretation provides a standard set of proce-
dures and formulas to perform this calculation.
One of its strong points is that it conforms to
the dominant axiom system for probability,
which was developed by Kolmogorov.
The formula used to calculate the probabil-
ity of a hypothesis on the evidence is read: the
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probability of the hypothesis H given the evi-
dence E equals the probability of the evidence
given the hypothesis multiplied by the proba-
bility of the hypothesis taken alone divided by
the probability of the evidence taken alone.
P(H∕E) =
P(E∕H)P(H)
P(E)
The first point to note here is that prior
probabilities have to be entered into the
formula before any evidence is available. How-
ever, it is generally accepted that there is no
non-arbitrary way to choose these prior prob-
abilities. More fundamental is one of Popper’s
criticisms. If we search for the most probable
theories, then we shall abandon the most
informative theories of science because there
is an inverse relationship between probability
and information content. Glymour (1980)
pointed out that it is unclear how to con-
nect Bayesianism with the history of science.
Neither Copernicus, Newton, nor Kepler—to
name but a few of the greats—gave probabilistic
arguments for their theories.
Another criticism, based on an evolutionary
theory of belief, is that at any given moment,
we cannot decide what we believe. We can
research an issue more or less thoroughly, but
we cannot voluntarily adopt, reject, or change
the degree to which we adhere to our beliefs
(Percival, 2012). Evidence and argument have
their impact on belief, and the soundness of an
argument enhances its persuasiveness. How-
ever, when a telling argument has its effect,
it is as if the mind had been infected by it,
rather like a catchy tune. Belief is not some-
thing that we do. We cannot therefore obey
the prescriptions that issue from the Bayesian
evaluations of data. In contrast, falsification-
ism instructs one to perform the fallible but
feasible task of classifying basic observation
statements as true or false. This is something
we can do. Imagine putting true and false
statements into separate boxes. Belief is also
a capricious individual state of mind, spon-
taneously varying from moment to moment
and with changing risks and outcomes. On the
other hand, since statements, as opposed to
beliefs, are permanent records independent of
our psychology, falsificationism is not troubled
by the vagaries of a scientist’s momentary state
of mind. Therefore falsificationism is a far
more stable and publicly testable method than
assigning degrees of probability to subjective
belief. It also harmonizes better with Popper’s
point that the overwhelming amount of sci-
entific knowledge is and must be embodied
in libraries and computers, not in scientists’
minds.
SEE ALSO: Bayesian Analysis; Duhem–Quine
Thesis; Evidence-Based Assessment; Hypothetico-
Deductive Model; Laws of Nature; Natural Kinds;
Popper, Karl (1902–94); Positivism and Logical
Positivism
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ABSTRACT
Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of
those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a
statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as
false in the light of observation reports. This simple picture hides profound problems in the methodology of
science and epistemology. In reaction to the skeptic’s attack on the possibility of certain or certified truth,many
writers have opted forwhat they regard as the next best feasible substitute: probable, reliable, or consistent theo-
ries. Within the philosophy of science there is a long-running debate about the meaning, relative importance,
and feasibility of confirmation and falsification and their role in the advancement of science. Although not
confined to the issue of induction in science, the debate centers on this issue.
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